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Abstract. It seems possible to know that a mathematical claim is necessarily true by inspect-
ing a diagrammatic proof. Yet how does this work, given that human perception seems to just 
(as Hume assumed) ‘show us particular objects in front of us’? I draw on Peirce’s account of 
perception to answer this question. Peirce considered mathematics as experimental a science as 
physics. Drawing on an example, I highlight the existence of a primitive constraint or blocking 
function in our thinking which we might call ‘the hardness of the mathematical must’. 
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1 Introduction 
We can come to know that a mathemati-
cal claim is true by inspecting a diagram, 
as in Fig. 1. What is being perceived 
here? Not just that 2 × 3 is 3 × 2, but that 
2 × 3 must be 3 × 2. It is clear that trying 
to create an option such as 2 × 3 = 3 × 3 
would be futile. We could of course prove 
the same claim in a more stepwise, sym-
bolic manner, but this diagram seems to 
give us everything we need to ascertain 
the necessary truth.  
     Yet how exactly does this work? Much 
mainstream analytic epistemology arguably makes such knowledge-gathering seem 
impossible [1], through a materialist understanding of perception, deriving ultimately 
from Hume’s empiricism, according to which, we might say, ‘experience only shows 
us the particular objects in front of us’. This produces a highly sceptical treatment of 
modality, which Hume famously used to undermine so-called causal necessity [1]. 
Attempts to challenge this often meet intimidating charges of anti-naturalism.  
2 Hume’s Legacy and Its Challenges 
Hume’s particular empiricism led him to coin a supposedly common-sense maxim, 
widely taken for granted today: “There are no necessary connections between dis-
tinct existences”. The maxim follows from two key Humean claims about perception: 
i) it is passive—involving nothing more than ‘registering’ the impact of individual 
physical objects on the sense organs, ii) it is atomistic—ideas are only distinct if fully 
separable in imagination. Consequently Hume banishes from his epistemology ab-
stract ideas, whose determinable properties lack determination (e.g. a ‘general trian-
gle’). Allowing these would render the mind active in choosing which determinables 
to elide. The early modern Hume sees this denial as properly naturalistic against scho-
lasticism. Consider Fig. 1. Does it display a necessary connection between distinct 
existences? Well, what are the ‘existences’? Humeans have a number of choices here:   
i) Physical Marks: The relevant existences are 5 oval-shaped and 6 star-shaped marks, 
exactly as inscribed on the page. This choice appears natural given the organisation of 
our visual field and—invoking Hume’s separate imaginability criterion—we can im-
agine each shape existing alone on the page. But there are necessary connections 
between these objects in Fig 1. For instance one cannot remove stars from the vertical 
ovals without changing the number of stars in the horizontal ovals. Interpreted thus, 
then, Hume’s maxim seems simply incorrect.  
ii) Abstract Objects: Alternatively one might claim that Fig.1 displays a truth about 
something more ideal—e.g. three ‘2s’ and two ‘3s’.  These are arguably not distinct, 
since 2 is made up of ‘two ones’ and 3 of ‘three ones’, so 2 is a proper part of 3. At 
this point, then, Hume might defend his maxim by stating that Fig 1 expresses rela-
tions between ideas, not matters of fact, and only the latter is accessed through per-
ception, whilst the former is mere semantic stipulation. But this is somewhat unsatis-
fying. If mathematics merely concerns a world of ideas, how are physical diagrams so 
startlingly effective? Furthermore, now Hume’s maxim seems to beg the question. Is 
he not arbitrarily ruling out that we perceive existences between which necessary 
connections hold, effectively stating: “There are no necessary connections between 
distinct existences, which are those existences without necessary connections”.  
iii) “Both”: One might consider combining the two views as follows: the existences 
are ovals and stars and ‘2s’ and ‘3s’. However this raises tricky questions about the 
relationship between the physical marks and the numerical objects. If they are all 
separate, why include physical marks in the diagram? Why not ‘cut to the chase’ and 
just include the numerical objects? Obviously that is impossible, which points to our 
preferred interpretation. 
iv) “Hybrid...but not both”: Attribute to the physical marks and numbers partial iden-
tities. What does this mean? Just that ‘twoness’ is a property which may be abstracted 
from two star-shaped marks on the page, while precisely not being separable from 
them. Abstraction without separation is essential for all structural reasoning. This 
includes our example since it turns on recognising that two abstractable but not sepa-
rable structures: 2 × 3 (two rows of three stars) and 3 × 2 (three columns of two stars) 
– are in fact identical. Structural reasoning is surely a significant part of mathematics. 
So what theory of perception could do justice to it? 
3 
3 A Peircean Approach 
Peirce suggests we need to give separate, interlocking, accounts of: i) immediate 
experience of objects: the percept, ii) the truth of symbols derived from that 
experience: the perceptual judgment. The percept is a non-cognitive direct encounter 
with some object. It is not a Humean idea, nor does it express truth-claims, it “simply 
knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway” [5]. On the other 
hand, the perceptual judgement takes propositional (subject-predicate) form, and its 
interpretation opens to the community of inquiry in an endless series of judgments, 
each member of which is logically related to prior members. The perceptual 
judgement does not copy the percept, as they are too unlike one another. How do they 
relate? Contra Hume, percepts cause perceptual judgements, while not being the 
source of their content. Human evolution ensures that each percept causes “direct and 
uncontrollable interpretations”. This process can and must be trained through 
cultivating appropriate mental habits, through public criticism in a common language.  
So what kind of ‘existence’ is the mathematical percept? We should take seriously 
Peirce’s repeated claims that mathematics is as experimental a science as physics, but 
the mathematician’s laboratory is the diagram [5].  Again consider Fig. 1. First note 
that the mathematical percept, like all percepts, is strictly impossible to describe in 
words. However, when I ‘got’ this proof, I suddenly grasped the horizontal and 
vertical star-arrangements as one, as if the same 5 ovals were ‘holding both together’. 
‘Holding together’ is a metaphor, as the arrangements are not strictly parts of the 
diagram (as not separable, only abstractable). But looking at the diagram and thinking 
about abstracting other arrangements from it (such as three threes), I could feel myself 
not being able to think of them. We might call this primitive blocking or constraint, in 
homage to Wittgenstein, ‘the hardness of the mathematical must’. With my prior 
mathematical training, this prompts me to an ‘uncontrollable interpretation’ that the 
proposition 2 × 3 = 3 × 2 must be true. No matter how hard I try to interpret Fig. 1 as 
2 × 3 = 3 × 3 – I simply cannot think that way. (Try it yourself...) Thus Peirce notes 
that although mathematics deals with a world of ideas, not material objects, its 
discoveries are something to which our minds are forced. My felt ‘hardness’ now 
becomes the necessity of the perceptual judgment: 2 × 3 = 3 × 2. 
Thus, despite many philosophers’ bafflement, we do perceive necessity. I have ar-
gued that perception is in fact the only way we come to know necessity, as all 
necessary reasoning involves experimenting on diagrams to determine structural 
dependencies [2,3,4]. Necessary truths are abstractable from physical marks and this 
is not an ontological reification but an epistemic capacity. Arguably the whole 
concept of ‘abstract object’, so problematic in recent philosophy of mathematics, 
arises from not understanding that (contra Hume) one can abstract without separating. 
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